Collar Strategies for Commodity Price Risk: Defining the Band Before the Market Defines It for You
The wrong way to build a collar is to start with the premium. Many treasury teams
approach the structure backwards: they identify a call strike that generates enough
premium to offset the cost of the put, then declare the resulting band acceptable
because the net cost is zero or close to it. The band was not designed — it was priced.
The put strike may sit below the level at which the business genuinely absorbs margin
damage, and the call strike may cap participation in favourable price moves that the
procurement budget had already anticipated. We have seen collar programmes that were
technically correct in every derivative mechanic and structurally useless in practice
because neither strike reflected an operationally meaningful threshold. The collar
looked tidy on a term sheet and created confusion at the next board presentation when
the physical purchase price moved outside the band in a direction the treasury team had
not modelled.
The correct sequence is the reverse. Start with the exposure
analysis: at what commodity price does the business's margin compress to the point where
the procurement plan requires revision? That price becomes the candidate put strike.
Then ask: at what commodity price does the budget already assume a windfall that
procurement does not actually need to capture? That price becomes the candidate call
strike. Only after both strikes are derived from operational data should the team
approach a dealer to price the structure. If the resulting net premium is not zero, that
is a data point about the current options market, not a reason to move the strikes back
to where the premium balances.
A collar creates three distinct zones of outcome, and practitioners need to be precise
about what happens in each. Below the put strike, the option provides a floor: the
effective purchase price is capped at the put strike plus any net premium paid. Between
the put strike and the call strike, the business is fully exposed to spot price movement
— the collar provides no protection and no participation constraint in this range. Above
the call strike, the sold call obligates the business to forgo any benefit from further
price increases beyond that level, because the call seller effectively passes the upside
to the counterparty.
The middle zone is frequently misunderstood. Treasury
teams sometimes present a collar to a board as if it eliminates price uncertainty across
the full range. It does not. It eliminates uncertainty at the extremes while leaving the
central band fully open. If the commodity spends most of its time in that central band —
which is common for markets with moderate volatility — the collar's practical effect is
limited to the insurance value of the put and the opportunity cost of the sold call.
That is not a criticism of the structure. It is a description of what the structure
actually does, and that description should be in the board paper before the programme is
approved, not discovered during a post-trade review.
Basis risk interacts with collar structures in a way that is worth addressing
explicitly. The strikes are set against a reference price — typically an exchange-traded
futures settlement or a published index. If the physical commodity the business actually
purchases tracks that reference imperfectly, the collar's effective protection zone
shifts by the basis. A put strike set at a level that protects the business's margin may
not trigger at exactly the right physical price if the basis widens at the moment the
market falls. We covered the mechanics of basis quantification in our article on basis
risk. The same pre-trade diagnostic applies here: before finalising collar strikes,
calculate the historical basis between the reference price and the physical purchase
index, and adjust the put strike downward by a margin that reflects the expected basis
range. This is a conservative adjustment, and it will typically widen the net premium.
That wider premium is the honest cost of the protection, not a pricing anomaly to be
engineered away by moving the strikes.
Funding the put by selling a call is
not the only collar structure available. Some businesses prefer to pay a net premium for
a collar that places both strikes at more operationally meaningful levels. Others use
three-way collars — adding a second put at a lower strike — to reduce the upfront
premium while retaining some protection below the primary put. These variations exist,
but they each introduce additional complexity in terms of accounting treatment under
AASB 9 and additional documentation requirements under ISDA master agreements. The
appropriate structure depends on the specific exposure profile, the organisation's hedge
accounting policy, and the internal capacity to monitor and report on a multi-leg
position.
Accounting treatment for collar structures under AASB 9 requires specific attention
before the trade is executed. A collar that qualifies for hedge accounting must be
designated as a hedging instrument in its entirety — the put and the call together
constitute a single instrument, not two separate positions. The hedge documentation must
specify the hedged item, the hedging instrument, the nature of the risk being hedged,
and the method for assessing hedge effectiveness. Under AASB 9, the effectiveness
assessment must demonstrate that an economic relationship exists between the hedged item
and the hedging instrument, that credit risk does not dominate the value changes, and
that the hedge ratio reflects the actual quantities being hedged.
For a
collar, the effectiveness assessment typically uses a regression or scenario analysis
that compares changes in the fair value of the collar to changes in the fair value of
the hedged item across a range of commodity price outcomes. The asymmetric payoff
profile of the collar — the put provides a floor, the call caps the upside — means the
effectiveness assessment must cover scenarios both above and below the current price,
not just a linear sensitivity. Treasury teams that rely on a simple dollar-offset test
may find the collar fails the effectiveness threshold in periods of low volatility, when
the time value of the options dominates the intrinsic value. Engaging the organisation's
auditors in the hedge documentation process before the trade is placed, rather than
after the first reporting date, avoids the scenario where a carefully structured collar
is disqualified from hedge accounting on a technicality that was knowable in advance.